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ADMISSIBIITY OF HOSPITAL RECORDS
INTO EVIDENCE,
By ROBERT E. PowELL*
INTRODUCT[ONt
One of the most complex areas of evidence relates to
the admissibility of hospital records.1 Generally speaking,
this area subdivides itself into three questions: (1) Is a
hospital record prima facie admissible? (2) If not, what
parts, if any, are admissible? (3) For what purposes are
they admissible? Behind each of these questions lie multi-
ple problems of privilege, hearsay, relevancy, and opinion
(both lay and expert). It is the purpose of this article to
point up these problems and to show the manner in which
* Of the Maryland Bar; A.B. 1957, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B.
1960, University of Maryland.
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'The ,term "hospital records" as used herein includes records of all
medical institutions, e.g. sanitariums, asylums, nursing homes, and clinics,
as well as records of ordinary hospitals. Under the law all of these
records appear to be offered under the same conditions and are admissible
if they satisfy the rules herein discussed. Kirkpatrick v. Wells, 319 Mo.
1040, 6 S.W. 2d 591 (1928) ; Norville, The Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act, 27 Or. L. Rev. 188 (1948). It is noted that in most juris-
dictions the term equally applies to the records of physicians or psychi-
atrists. Freedman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 342 Pa. 404, 21
A. 2d 81 (1941) ; Wojciechowski v. 'States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 155
F. Supp. 874 (D.C. Md. 1957). However, in -Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.
v. Zapf, 192 Md. 403, 411, 64 A. 2d 139 (1949), the Court, in holding an
x-ray report to be inadmissible where such report was prepared by a
radiologist on request by a physician, indicated that such a report could
not be admitted as a hospital record. The result in that case is possibly
distinguishable on the grounds that the report was requested and made as
an extraordinary measure, and not in the regular course of business.
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they have been handled by the courts of the several states,
with particular emphasis on Maryland.
Before dealing directly with the admissibility of hos-
pital records, it is necessary to examine their nature and
contents. They generally can be broken down into those
prepared by nurses or doctors on the admission of the
patient, the "history" of the patient, the records of his
medication and treatment, notes and comments of his
nurse (particularly in the case of psychiatric patients),
records of discharge or death, and official records, required
by state law, of birth, stillbirth, death, death of the fetus,
and of certain highly contagious and dangerous diseases.'
Each of these types of records may contain information
which was personally known to the entrant, or was de-
duced as opinion from direct observation and recorded by
the nurse, diagnostician or both, or was narrated to the
entrant by the patient or someone speaking on his behalf.
PRIVILEGE AND LACK OF CONFRONTATION
The proffer of a hospital record presents at the outset
two basic questions: first, whether the contents thereof
are privileged; and second, whether the lack of confronta-
tion by the declarant, due to the hearsay quality of the
record, as discussed below, deprives a criminal defendant
against whom the record is proffered of any constitutional
rights. In some jurisdictions a hospital record may be
excluded from evidence because the matter contained
therein is privileged.' There is no problem in this regard
in Maryland, since no physician-patient privilege has been
recognized.4 But in those jurisdictions which have adopted
such a privilege it is clear that confidential information
given by a patient to a physician or psychiatrist and
2 Applicable statutes In Maryland are: 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 43 § 11 -
which requires physicians to file reports of certain diseases contracted as
a result of one's employment; § 14(a) - which makes it mandatory that
the State Board of Health collect certificates of birth, death and, stillbirth
and that it preserve the same; § 17 - which specifies the required
contents Df 'birth certificates; § 18 - which provides for the execution
and filing of death certificates; 'and § 20 - which provides for the execu-
tion and filing of birth and stillbirth certificates. See also 2 MD. CODE(1957) Art. 22, § 8, which requires the preparation and recording of
records of post mortem examinations by the state medical examiners.
, Key v. Cosmopolitan Life, Health & Acc. Ins. Co., 102 S.W. 2d 797(Mo. 1937); Kirpatrick v. American Creosoting Co., 225 Mo. App. 774,
37 S.W. 2d 996 (1931); Smart v. Kansas City, 208 Mo. 162, 105 S.W.
709 (1907) ; Weis v. Weis, 127 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E. 2d 245, 252 (1947) ;
Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co., 158 Wash. 696, 291 P. 1101 (1930) ; McCoRMicK,
EVIDENCE (1954) § 290, 613; Hale, Hospital Records, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev.
99, 108 (1941).
' O'Brien v. State, 126 Md. 270, 94 A. 1034 (1915).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
recorded, and the diagnostic opinions based thereon, are
privileged.' In regard to routine entries made by nurses,
attendants and technicians, there is some disagreement as
to whether a privilege exists. Since the physician-patient
privilege is not a creature of the common law, but one of
statute, the problem is usually one of statutory interpre-
tation.' And, because the statutes creating the privilege
are in derogation of the common law, they have generally
been given strict interpretations and therefore, hospital
records prepared by persons not specifically mentioned in
the statutes have been admitted without regard to the
privilege.7 However, it is to be noted that nurses and
attendants, being considered to be agents of the physician,
have been barred from testifying by reason of the
privilege.8 Following this concept it would appear that
even where nurses, for example, are not specifically men-
tioned in the statute, the privilege should apply to records
prepared by them for physicians as well as to the records
of the physicians themselves. Nevertheless, the question
appears to depend completely upon how the applicable
statute is interpreted, and the tendency is toward a
literal reading.
The second question, that relating to the lack of con-
frontation in the production of a hospital record, is not as
problematical as the first. It has been argued that the
production of a hospital record containing assertions by
the victim of a crime violates the defendant's right to
confrontation secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States and by
Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. It is true
that there is a lack of confrontation present, as in all
hearsay declarations; however, it has generally been held
that the admission of such matter does not abridge any
constitutional guarantees.' Thus, there is no basis for
5 Kaplan v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York, 109 F. 2d 463, 465
(D.C. Cir. 1939); Weis v. Weis, 8upra, n. 3; MCCORMICK, IOC. Cit. supra,
n. 3.
6 MCCORMICK, OP. cit. supra, n. 3, § 101, 211; 8 WIGMOLI, BEvmNcE (3rd
ed. 1940), 2380; Chafee, No Justice Served by Closing the Doctor's
Mouth, 52 Yale L.J. 607 (1943).
Weis v. Weis, supra, n. 3; Leuslnk v. O'Donnell, 255 Wis. 627, 39
N.W. 2d 675 (1949).
8Culver v. Union Pac. R. Co., 112 Neb. 441, 450, 199 N.W. 794, 797
(1924) ; Meyer v. Russell, 55 N.D. 546, 214 N.W. 857 (1926).
0United States v. Leathers, 135 F. 2d 507 (2d Cir. 1943); Jones v.
State, 205 Md. 528, 109 A. 2d 49 (1954) ; Morrow v. State, 190 Md. 559,
59 A. 2d 325 (1947); O'Donnell v. State, 188 Md. 693, 53 A. 2d 688
(1947); Johns v. State, 55 Md. 350, 359 (1881) (right of confrontation
does not apply to documentary evidence) ; People v. Nisonoff, 293 N.Y.
587, 59 N.E. 2d 420 (1944); State v. 'Guaraneri, 59 R.I. 173, 194 A. 589
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treating hospital records differently in criminal cases; and
the same rules governing their admission are applicable
in both criminal and civil trials.
THE HEARSAY PROBLEM
In the first instance, it is clear that hospital records,
being written accounts of acts or observations of various
individuals, which are offered to prove the truth of the
matters asserted therein, constitute hearsay evidence,
which McCormick defines as:
" . testimony in court or written evidence, of a
statement made out of court, such statement being
offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters
asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon
the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."1
It follows from this definition that where the witness
through whom the record is offered was not the entrant,
the asserted facts contained in a written record, when
offered for their truth, are of necessity hearsay, for
belief of those assertions rests upon the credibility of the
entrant or one who dictated or narrated them to the
entrant. If, on the other hand, the witness was the em-
trant and could sufficiently vouch for the accuracy of the
record, although he could not presently recollect the facts
contained therein, then the record could be offered as
the testimony of the witness - the record constituting past
recollection recorded." However, in the main, the hospital
record as a whole constitutes a compilation of hearsay
assertions; and in order for it to be admissible, it must
fall within some exception to the rule against hearsay.
HoSPITAL RECORDS AS SATISFYING A HEARSAY EXCEPTION
I. Circumstantial Probability of Trustworthiness
and Necessity
The exceptions to the rule against hearsay are con-
sidered to be based upon a special necessity for the ad-
(1937). For a more thbrough discussion of this problem see 5 WIGMORE,
EvIDEN CE (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 1395-1418.10 McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) § 225, 460.
"Cogswell v. Frazier, 183 Md. 654, 661, 39 A. 2d 815 (1944) ("The
witness' adoption of his written report made it his present assertion.");
MCCORMICK, OP. cit. Supra, n. 10, §§ 276-280, 590-595; 3 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE
(3rd ed. f940) §§ 734-757; Note, Past Recollection Recorded, 28 Iowa L.
Rev. 530 (1943) ; cf. Riley v. Naylor, 179 Md. 1, 16 A. 2d 857 (1940);
Mercantile T. & D. Co. v. Rode, 137 Md. 362, 112 A. 510 (1921).
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mission of the hearsay declaration, or upon a high cir-
cumstantial probability of trustworthiness. 12  Generally
both are present although one may be more pertinent than
the other, depending on the exception. Necessity may be
found to exist in either the unavailability of the de-
clarant,"3 or an inability to obtain the evidence contained
in the assertion from another source. 4 These two factors
are considered to offset the lack of the recognized counter-
weights to hearsay evidence - oath, confrontation., and
cross-examination. 5
Hospital records have been admitted into evidence under
two separate exceptions: ( 1) that for public or official docu-
ments and records," and (2) that for business records. 7 No
matter which exception has been used, the reliability of the
records has been found to exist in the fact that they are
prepared under a duty owing by the entrant to both his
employer and patient, the recovery - or even life - of
the patient depending on their accuracy; and, additionally,
in the case of the business records exception, because the
records are kept in the regular course of the hospital busi-
ness.
In Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart, '1 the leading Mary-
land case on the reliability of hospital records, the Court
of Appeals expressed the view which prevails today as
follows:
"The question here presented is whether evidence
represented by the hospital chart contains a sufficient
guarantee of its truthfulness. We are of the opinion
115 WIGMORE, EVMENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 1421, 1422 and 1423, 204-5.
Id., § 1421.
Id., § 1422, 204, wherein WrmoRE states:
"This circumstantial probability of trustworthiness Is found In a
variety of circumstances sanctioned by judicial practice; and It is
usually from one of these salient circumstances that the exception
takes its name. There is no comprehensive attempt to secure
uniformity in the degree of trustworthiness which these circum-
stances presuppose. It is merely that common sense and experience
have from time to time pointed them out as practically adequate
substitutes for the ordinary test, at least, in view of the necessity
of the situation."
WIGMORE, OP. Cit. supra, n. 12, § § 1420, 1421, 1422.
18Brown v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55 F. 2d 159 (8th Cir. 1932);
Motley v. State, 174 Miss. 568, 165 So. 296 (1936) ; Schaefer v. Lowell-
Krekeler Grocery Co., 49 S.W. 2d 209 (Mo. 1932); Kirkpatrick v. Wells,
319 Mo. 1040, 6 S.W. 2d 591 (1928).
"7Watts v. Delaware Ooach Co., 44 Del. 283, 58 A. 2d 689 (1948), noted
in 47 Mich. L. Rev. 124 (1948); Old v. Cooney Detective Agency, 215
Md. 517, 138 A. 2d 889 (1958); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart, 152
Md. 439, 137 A. 43 (1927); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E. 2d
245 (1947) ; Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 325, 41 A. 2d 688 (1945).
152 Md. 439, 137 A. 43 (1927).
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that it does. It is a record required by the hospital
authorities to be made by one whose duty it is to
correctly make the entries therein contained. So far
as the hospital is concerned, there could be no more
important record than the chart which indicates the
diagnosis, the condition, and treatment of the patients.
* * * On the other hand, there is the strongest reason
why [the entrant should make the entries correctly
and accurately]: First, because of the great responsi-
bility, he knowing that the treatment of the patient
depends largely upon his record, and if it be incorrect
it may result, and probably will result, in the patient's
failure to receive proper surgical or medical treat-
ment, which failure might be followed by serious con-
sequences or even death. Second, the entrant must
realize and appreciate that his position is dependent
upon the accuracy with which the record is made.
Third, as was stated by Tindall, C.J., in Poole v. Dicas,
1 Bing. N.C. 649: 'It is easier to state what is true
than what is false; the process of invention implies
trouble in such a case unnecessarily incurred.' "19
The court may well have added an additional reason -
that a doctor or nurse may in all likelihood expose himself
to tort liability if he is not accurate in his recorded state-
ments and such inaccuracy results in serious illness, in-jury, or death;" or, in some cases, to criminal liability. 21
It clearly follows that there is every reason to accept hos-
pital records as being reliable insofar as they are offered
merely to prove that the beliefs and experiences of such
an entrant are accurately reported. However, as will be
shown later, recorded statements of the patient cannot be
afforded the same degree of reliability, and what reliability
can be afforded them cannot logically be said to rest upon
the same bases.
There is some confusion as to whether it is required
that there be a necessity for admitting the record. At com-
mon law it was generally required that the declarant either
be produced in court or be shown to be unavailable.22 As
'9 Id., 446-447.
20 It is apparent that either nonfeasance of misfeasance in the prepara-
tion of medical records upon which others are to depend in treating the
patient could constitute the proximate cause of either bodily or mental
injury, and hence, give rise to an action for malpractice.
21 Infra, circa n. 36.
21 Globe Indemnity Co, v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 447, 137 A. 43 (1927)
"What we have said (in connection with the reliability and admissibility
of hospital records) applies to a case when the person who made the
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mentioned above, if the entrant was produced in court
and was unable to testify from his present recollection as
to the original facts reported in the record, the record
could sometimes be admitted as past recollection re-
corded." On the other hand, where the entrant was un-
available, the record would be admitted into evidence
under an exception to the rule against hearsay, and in such
cases the necessity for receiving the hearsay evidence
was found in the unavailability of the entrant.24 However,
due to the development of large scale business enterprises
- wherein numerous persons would be involved in a single
transaction - the unavailability requirement was relaxed
so as to allow the production of a record on a showing that
it would be inconvenient to produce the entrant, or other
persons involved in the transaction, if they could be
identified at all.25
The exception as it exists today in most jurisdictions
under either the Model Act for Proof of Business Trans-
actions or the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act,26
does not appear to require the entrant to be either pro-
duced or shown to be unavailable.2 7 There is no mention
in the former of any such requirement, and the latter
merely requires that the record be identified by the "cus-
todian or other qualified witness."
In those jurisdictions which admit hospital records as
public documents, the trend seems to be toward merely
entries on the chart is dead, insane or inaccessible .. ") ; Zipus v. United
Rwys. & El. Co., 135 Md. 297, 302, 108 A. 884 (1919); Hall v. Trimble,
104 Md. 317, 324, 64 A. 1026 (1906) ; McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) § 288;
5 WIGMORE, Op. Cit. supra, n. 12, § 1521. It is noted, however, that under
the provisions of 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 59 (infra, n. 46), un-
availability does not appear to be important., West v. Fidelity-Balto.
Bank, 219 Md. 258, 165, 147 A. 2d 859 (1959) ; Lee v. Housing Auth. of
Baltimore, 203 Md. 453, 459, 101 A. 2d 832 (1954).23 Supra, n. 11.
2 Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 137 A. 43 (1927)
WIcwfoE, loc. cit. 8upra, n. 22. 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, n. 12, § 1530,
379 states:
"... that where an entry is made by one person in the regular course
of business, recording an oral or written report, made to him by
other persons in the regular course of business, of a transaction lying
in the personal knowledge of the latter persons [the entrants], there
is no objection to receiving that entry under the present Exception,
verified by the testimony of the former person only, or of a superior
who testifies to the regular course of business, provided the practical
inconvenience of producing on the stand the numerous other persons
thus concerned would in the particular case outweigh the probable
utility of doing so."
The same opinion is implied in Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart.
"M ',CCoRMiICK, op. cit. supra, n. 10, 606.
21 Infra, circa ns. 45-49.
2 MCCORAMCK, Op. cit. supra, n. 10, 608.
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having the custodian or some other person qualified to
vouch for its authenticity identify it.28 In relation to
public documents the necessity requirement has generally
been found to rest upon the inconvenience that would be
caused public officials if they were required to appear in
court every time such documents were proffered.29
II. Hospital Records as Public Documents
Five states, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio
and Texas, each of which have statutes requiring hospitals
to keep records, have reached the conclusion that such
records, if kept in accordance with the statutory provi-
sions, constitute public records and are admissible in evi-
dence as such,"0 but they are only considered to be com-
petent in regard to facts required by law to be kept
therein. 1 Therefore, it follows that, despite the fact that
the record is legally considered to be a public document,
all of it is not necessarily admissible. Following this con-
cept, hospital records have been admitted to prove that a
deceased person died of natural causes rather than by
reason of the defendant's negligence 2 and to prove that
a workman's compensation complainant had suffered from
epilepsy before his injury;3 but a narrative statement of
an unidentified relative of a deceased person has been
held to be inadmissible where it was included in the rec-
ord.3 4
There is little logical basis for giving the average
hospital record the dignity of a public document, espe-
cially where the hospital is not supported by the state.
The entrant, whether a doctor or nurse, is not a sworn
representative of the public; he is not performing any
governmental function; he is not responsible to the state
legislature or governor; and the records themselves carry
no official seal or certification. Therefore, how can it
logically follow that such records are public documents?
2S Schaefer v. Lowell-Krekeler Grocery Co., 49 S.W. 2d 209 (Mo. 1932)
Kirkpatrick v. Wells, 319 Mo. 1040, 6 S.W. 2d 591 (1928) ; Galli v. Wells,
209 Mo. App. 460, 239 S.W. 894 (1922).
25 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 1630-1633.
"I Kimber v. Kimber, 317 Ill. 561, 148 N.E. 293 (1925) ; Motley v. State,
174 Miss. 568, 165 So. 296, 298 (1936) ; Key v. Cosmopolitan Life, Health
and Acc. Ins. Co., 102 S.W. 2d 797 (Mo. 1937). It is noted that Illinois has
admitted such records under both exceptions. Cf. Wright v. Upson, 303
Ill. 120, 135 N.E. 209 (1922).
31 Cassidy v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 31 N.E. 2d 463 (Ohio, 1940).
2 Kirkpatrick v. Wells, 319 Mo. 1040, 6 S.W. 2d 591 (1928).
11 Lamkins v. Copper-Clad Malleable Range Corporation, 42 S.W. 2d 941
(Mo. 1931).
81 Collins v. Leahy, 102 S.W. 2d 801 (Mo. 1937).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In some instances there seems to be more justification.
For instance, most states require the preparation and offi-
cial filing of birth, stillbirth, death, and death of the
fetus certificates, 35 and impose a criminal penalty for
failure to do so or for impropriety in doing so.16 In adcli-
tion, these certificates are generally compiled and pre-
served by an agency of the state. However, are we to
consider the copy or record retained by the hospital,
physician, or coroner as a public document? In many
states, including Maryland, there no longer is any prob-
lem as to the admissibility of records of this nature as
they have statutes declaring them to be admissible, and
moreover, to be prima facie evidence of the facts con-
tained therein. 7
III. Business Records Exception
The business records exception to the rule against hear-
say appears to be an outgrowth of the common law
"Shopbook Rule," which admitted records of merchants
and handicraftsmen for the purpose of proving the par-
ticulars of a transaction and the delivery of wares.3
See Maryland statutes, supra, n. 2.
'1See 4MD. CODE (1957) Art. 43, § 28 (a)-(c), (e).
874 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 43, § 27 provides:
"Certificates of birth, death and stillbirth filed within six months
after the event, and certified copies of such certificates, shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Data therein per-
taining to the father of a child are prima facie evidence only If the
alleged faither is the husband of the mother; if not, the data per-
taining to the father of a child are not evidence in any proceeding
adverse to the interests of the alleged father, or of his heirs, next
of kin, devisees, legatees or other successors in interest, if the
paternity is controverted."
See also 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 22, § 8, which in reference to reports
of the state post mortem examiners provides among other things that:
"The records of the office of the chief medical examiner, and of
several deputy medical examiners, made by themselves or by anyone
under their direction or supervision, or transcripts thereof certified
by such medical examiner, shall be received as competent evidence
in any court in this State of the matters and facts therein contained."
It is noted that this statute is extremely broad in relation to what sort
of facts are considered to be a proper part thereof, in that it provides that:
"It shall be the duty of the chief medical examiner . . . to keep
full and complete records . . . giving the name, if known, of every
such person [constituting a medical examiner's case], the place where
the body was found, date and cause of death, and, all other available
information relating thereto."
It would appear that any information which the medical examiner feels
pertinent to the cause of death should be recorded whether or not there
is a direct causal connection between such fact and the death. Thus, under
this statute there is clearly a wide range of information which can con-
stitute a proper part of the record.
8 R'adtke v. Taylor, 105 Or. 559, 210 -P. 863, 866 (1922); McCoRMIcK,
EVIDENCE (1954) § 282, 597; 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 1518.
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This exception was limited by a statute enacted in Eng-
land in 1609.11 However, a need for such evidence per-
sisted due to the fact that parties to a litigation were
considered incompetent as witnesses and without being
able to produce their records had no available evidence,4"
and due to the growth and development of large scale
business and trade.41 As a result a slightly broader rule
existed in nearly all American jurisdictions by the early
1800's. 42
Requirements for satisfaction of this rule remained
strict, 3 but because of a gradual relaxation of the rules
disqualifying interested witnesses from testifying and a
general feeling against exclusionary rules, further relaxa-
tion of the rule was made. The result was the presently
existing common law exception for business records: A
record is admissible if it was made in the regular course
of business by one who had a duty to make an entry and
who had personal knowledge of the facts (or to whom
the information in the record was communicated by one
who had such knowledge and who had a duty to report
the information). In addition, the entry must have been
made contemporaneously with the recorded event or trans-
action, and, probably, the entrant or person having personal
7 Jac. 1 c. 12; for a summary of this act see WIGMORE, op. cit. supra,
n. 38, § 1518, 347-348. Under this statute the rule was considerably
limited s'o as to only admit mercantile books which represented trans-
actions below a specified value and for only a period of one year following
the making of the transaction. Furthermore, due to a strong feeling
against self-made evidence, the courts placed a very strict interpretation
upon the statute. Sikes v. Marshall, 3 Esp. 705 (1798) ; Glyn v. Bank of
England, 2 Ves. 38 (1750) ; Grouch v. Drury, 1 Keble 27 (1661)
WIGMORE, loc. cit. supra, n. 38.
WIGMORE, op. Cit. supra, n. 38, § 1537.
* Id., McCoRMICK, ZoC. Cit. supra, n. 38.
41 Id. In England the rule was considerably broadened by the enact-
ment of other statutes in the late 1800's. WIGMORE, Zoo. cit. supra, n. 38.
"The major limitations as listed by Wigmore (WIGMORE, op. cit. supra,
n. 38, §§ 1537-1557) were: (1) that the party must have been his own
bookkeeper (it is noted that Maryland held contra, demanding that a
party could not have made 'the entry; Romer v. Jaecksch, 39 Md. 585
(1874) ; GoRTEa, LAW OF EVIDENCE (1916) 121) ; (2) that the entry could
not evidence a delivery of goods to a third party on the credit of the
defendant; (3) that the entry could not be offered to prove the terms
of a special contract (it is noted that the probable reason for this re-
quirement is that such a contract should have been in writing, which
writing would be the best evidence of the transaction) ; (4) that the
transaction involved could not exceed u set value; (5) 'that a special oath
to the justness of the account had to be filed; and (6) that the books
must have borne an honest appearance. The above listed limitations were
not uniform - some colonies, and later states, possessed most of them,
others only one or two.
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knowledge must be either unavailable or produced as a
witness in court.
41
Regardless of the broadening of the rule, the steady
growth of business demanded that additional steps be
taken, and in 1927 a committee of experts appointed by
the Commonwealth Fund of New York published the
Model Act for Proof of Business Transactions,4 5 which was
adopted almost verbatim by the Maryland Legislature in
1929.4' This act gave statutory force to the common law
" McCoRMICK, Op. cit. supra, n. 38, § 283, 599. It is noted that in Mary-
land there was one 'additional general requirement - that the entrant
must have had no particular motive 'to misrepresent. GORTER, op. cit.
8upra, n. 43, 120. This limitation appears to exist today to some extent in
Maryland and other states, as it has been held that self-serving state-
ments are inadmissible through hospital and other records. Hoffman v.
Palmer, 129 F. 2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942); Needle v. New York Railways
Corporation, 227 App. Div. 276, 237 N.Y.S. 547 (1929); Weis v. Weis.
147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E. 2d 245 (1947). In Maryland this requirement
was very strong and generally prevented the admission 'of a record which
was prepared by one of the parties to the litigation. Deland Mining
Co. v. Hanna, 112 Md. 528, 76 A. 850 (1910); Stallings v. Gottschalk,
77 Md. 429, 26 A. 524 (1893) ; Romer v. Jaecksch, 39 Md. 585 (1874).
"This act served as the model for the Federal Business Records Act,
28 U.S.C.A. (1950) § 1732 and for statutes In Maryland, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, -and Rhode Island. See, MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE (1954) 607; 48 Col. L. Rev. 920, 922.
"MD. LAWS 1929, Ch. 517, read as follows:
"Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry In a
book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act,
transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in
proof of said act, transaction, occurrence or event, if made in the
regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of
such business to make such memorandum or record 'at the time of
such act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable
time thereafter. All 'other circumstances of the making of such writ-
ing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or
maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect
its admissibility. The term 'business' shall include business, pro-
fession, occupation and calling of every kind."
This statute was strengthened somewhat in 1933 by a supplementary
act authorizing the admission of photostatic and photographic reproduc-
tions of records. This enactment, now 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 59
reads:
Any writing or record, or a photostatic or photographic re-
production thereof, whether in the form of an entry in a book or
otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of ;any act, transaction,
'occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said
act, transaction, occurrence or event, if made in the regular course
of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business
to make such memorandum or record, or photostatic or photographic
reproduction thereof at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence
or event or within a reasonable time thereafter, and photostatic
or photographic reproductions of such admissible documents, photo-
stated or photographed at a later time, shall likewise be admissible
for such purpose if photostated or photographed in the regular
course of business in good faith and without intent to defraud.
All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record,
or photostatic or photographic reproduction thereof, including lack
of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to
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rule (with the exception that it removed the requirement
that the entrant have personal knowledge), 7 dispensed with
the need for the entrant to be produced or be shown to
be unavailable, and extended the rule so that the term
"business" included "business, profession, occupation and
calling of every kind," thus bringing medical records
within the purview of the business records rule.
On the national scene other steps were taken in 1936
when the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recom-
mended the adoption of the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act,4" which was substantially the same as the
Model Act except that it expressly provided that a record,
would be competent evidence if the custodian or other
qualified witness testified to its identity, thus clearly
dispensing with the need to produce the entrant or those
individuals who were involved in the recorded trans-
action.49
In order for a given record, to be admissible the Uni-
form Act expressly requires that it be authenticated by an
appropriate witness. 0 Although the Model Act and the
Maryland Act do not expressly so provide, it is plain
from the cases that by implication the same requirement
is made. 1 In short, a foundation must be laid before the
affect the weight, but not the admissibility thereof. The term 'busi-
ness' shall include business, profession, occupation and calling of
every kind."
'7T Beth. Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 50 A. 2d 256 (1947)
(the Court expressly stated that the purpose of the Maryland Act was
to ,put an end to the requirement that the entrant have personal knowl-
edge or have personally observed the recorded facts).
489A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (1957) §§ 1-2, 299, provide that:
"The term 'business' shall include every kind of business, pro-
fession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether
carried on for profit or not."
"A record of an act, condition or event, shall, in so far as rele-
vant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified
witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and
if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the
time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the
court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation
were such as to justify its admission."
"The Uniform Act has been adopted in whole or in part by California,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Ver-
mont, Washington and Wyoming. McCoRMicK, EVIDENcE (1954) § 289,
n. 8, 607-8.
Supra, n. 48.
11Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 104 A. 2d 624 (1954); Snyder v.
Cearfoss, 190 Md. 151, 57 A. 2d 786 (1948); Weis v. Weis, 147 0.S. 416,
72 N.E. 2d 245 (1947). Cf. Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., 44 Del. 283,
58 A. 2d 689 (1948), noted in 47 Mich. L. Rev. 124 (1948), Brown v. Saint
Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W. 2d 688, 44 A.L.R. 2d 535
(1954). 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 1530, 379; 6 WIGMORF,
EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 1707.
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record itself is offered in evidence. It clearly follows
from the foregoing discussion of the general requirements
that the witness through whom the record is offered need
only identify it as being part of the customary records of
the particular business, and as having been prepared in the
normal course of the particular business.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PARTICULAR ENTams
In order for a hospital record to be admissible, the
entries contained therein must be pathologically germane
to the physical or mental condition which caused the
patient to seek medical assistance. "2 In essence, this re-
quirement is an adaptation to the particular case of hos-
pital records of the general rule that the subject matter
of the entry in a business record must be within the scope,
or course, of the business, as well as the record being
prepared in the regular course of business. 3 The problem,
at the outset, is how strict an interpretation is to be given
to the words "pathologically germane"? There are cer-
tain types of information which possess no immediate
medical value, but may possibly later aid in the treatment
of the patient and which are required, as a matter of
routine, to be obtained on the admittance of the patient
to the hospital. As an example, admissions clerks or
nurses are often required to obtain information as to the
circumstances in which an injury was sustained. This
information may contain statements of the patient which
amount to admissions, but possess no immediate medical
"
2Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., 44 Del. 283, 58 A. 2d 689 (1948), noted
in 47 Mich. L. Rev. 124 (1948) ; Lee v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore, 203
Md. 453, 101 A. 2d 832 (1954); Case v. Vearrindy, 339 Mich. 579, 64
N.W. 2d 670 (1954) ; Brown v. Saint Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 62
N.W. 2d 688, 44 A.L.R. 2d 535 (1954) ; Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa.
325, 41 A. 2d 688 (1945).
It is noted that "hospital records" as used in this discussion means
"hospital medical records" solely. Records of financial accounts of hos-
pitals are of course treated in the same manner as the ordinary business
records of any business and need not be pathologioally germane to a
patient's physical or mental condition.
M Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 ,Pa. 325, 41 A. 2d 688 (1945). Of.
Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., 44 Del. 283, 58 A. 2d 689 (1948).
The Maryland Act states that a record is admissible "if made in the
regular course of business, 'and if it was the regular course of such business
to make such memorandum or record. . . ." In Lee v. Housing Auth. of
Baltimore, 203 Md. 453, 101 A. 2d 832 (1954), the Court of Appeals, in
applying that requirement of the Act to the hospital "business," borrowed
the phrase "pathologically germane." A more direct statement of tae
rule is that of the Watts case where the court said an entry "may be
received in evidence at a trial only if so related to the complaint or
Injury involved as to facilitate prompt and intelligent diagnosis and treat-
ment."
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value. It is clear that where the requirement that the sub-
ject matter be pathologically germane is taken in its
strictest sense such information would be excluded. 4
Nonetheless, there still appear to be logical grounds for
admitting it, since the entrant was under a duty to make
the entry as a matter of routine, and it contained state-
ments amounting to admissions. Therefore, the entry
should be as reliable as those which are truly pathologi-
cally germane and should constitute competent evidence.
The requirement that an entry be pathologically ger-
mane is, however, the universal rule, but a finding that
an entry was pathologically germane is not in itself con-
clusive. The evidence contained therein must also be
competent and free from objection on other grounds.55
Thus, aside from making a determination as to whether
an entry is pathologically germane, it is necessary to test
the competency of the proffered evidence in regard to
other matters. There are many evidential problems which
may arise due to either the basic type of evidence or the
means through which it was obtained. These problems
vary, to a large degree depending on whether a proffered
entry was a recordation of information supplied by medi-
cal authorities which resulted from their personal obser-
vation or opinion, or a recordation of statements of the
patient or his representative.
To a large extent, the problems relating to the ad-
missibility of hospital records lie in the fact that many
entries constitute hearsay upon hearsay. This is particu-
larly true in regard to recordations of statements made
by the patient or his representative, but also applies to
some of the entries made 'by medical authorities without
reliance upon any information supplied by the patient.
A record is produced in court which represents the
declarations or thoughts of the entrant, but in many cases!
those declarations or thoughts were themselves mere
representations of the statements of another person, and
therefore, the credibility of the record depends not only
upon the accuracy of the entrant in making the entry but
Young v. McLaughlin, 126 Colo. 188, 247 P. 2d 813 (1952) ; Watts v.
Delaware Coach Co., 44 Del. 283, 58 A. 2d 689 (1948), noted in 47 Mich.
L. Rev. 124 (1948); Cohen v. Borough of Bradley Beach, 135 N.J.L.
276, 50 A. 2d 882 (1947).
"Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 451, 137 A. 43 (1927),
by way of strong dictum said that:
"... if [the hospital record's] contents upon examination would be
open to other objections, such as immateriality, irrelevancy, or that
it was an expression -of opinion by persons not competent to express
an opinion, these objections are not precluded. ... ."
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also upon the veracity of the declarant. Thus, two levels of
hearsay are present and it would appear that each level
must satisfy some exception to the rule against hearsay
before the record can be admitted into evidence.
It has been indicated by some cases that the hospital
record need only satisfy the business records rule in order
to make all of the matters contained therein admissible,
thus not requiring that double hearsay entries be treated
specially.5 6 However, the weight of authority, and of
reason, is contrary.57 Thus, although the admissibility of
the record itself is determined solely by the business
records exception, for the entries contained therein to
satisfy that exception by being a proper part of the record,
many of the important ones must themselves satisfy one
of the other exceptions.
Up to this point discussion has dealt solely with the
first level of hearsay - that relating to the hearsay quality
of the record itself. It is clear from that discussion that,
if the record satisfies the exception for business records
or that for official documents it is admissible for any pur-
pose for which the testimony of the entrant would be
admissible, if he were in court. Much of the discussion
following is concerned with the second level of hearsay
which would be present even if the entrant was called to
testify.
Aside from the hearsay problems, hospital records
present questions as to the admissibility of scientific and
opinion evidence. Many entries made by medical authori-
1 Schaefer v. Lowell-Krekeler Grocery Oo., 49 S.W. 2d 209 (Mo. 1932) ;
Kirkpatrick v. Wells, 319 Mo. 1040, 6 S.W. 2d 591 (1928); Motley v.
State, 174 Miss. 568, 165 So. 296 (1936). See also 4 Mn. CODs (1957)
Art. 43, § 27 (8upra, n. 37); Smiley v. Bergmore Realty Co., 222 Mo.
App. 141, 73 S.W. 2d 836 (1933) ; Smith v. Missouri Ins. Co., 60 S.W. 2d
730 (Mo. 1933).
uHale, Ho8pital Records as Evidence, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. 99 (1941).
Although the courts do not as a rule speak specifically in terms of testing
both levels of hearsay, it is evident that they do. See Brown v. Saint
Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W. 2d 688 (1954); Case v.
Vearrindy, 339 Mich. 579, 64 N.W. 2d 670 (1954). Of. Shirks Motor Ex-
press v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 106 A. 2d 46 (1954). All of these cases
speak the language of the res gestae exception for statements of present
bodily condition, infra, circa ns. 111-113. It is noted that such utterances
are necessarily pathologically germane, and there is therefore no obvious
necessity for a court to discuss both levels. However, in Pollack v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. 0o., 138 F. 2d 123 (3rd Cir. 1943), noted in 43
Mich. L. Rev. 411 (1944), the courts specifically stated that entries relating
to the age (of the patient satisfied the exception for matters of pedigree;
Pickering v. Peskind, 43 Ohio App. 401, 183 N.E. 301 (1930).
"It is noted thalt the exception for business records oannot be applied
to the first level of hearsay, regarding statements made by the patient,
since he does not make them in the regular course of a business with
which he is connected.
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ties contain information derived. by the use of scientific
or mechanical devices or by laboratory tests. The com-
petency of such information is dependent upon the ac-
curacy and competency of such devices or tests, and
could therefore be objectionable if the device or test in-
volved is not considered reliable by the court. A much
more complex problem arises in relation to the expression
of opinion in hospital records. Although some opinion can
be found in the recorded statements of the patient, the
problem as to the competency of opinion - whether the
declarant was competent to draw it; whether it was well
founded; or whether it was related to an ultimate fact or
issue - arises in every entry stating a physician's diag-
nosis, and in many entries expressing medical observations.
Thus, the same objections can be raised to the admission
of a record as would be available if the entrant were on
the stand; and the record, although satisfying the busi-
ness records rule (and another hearsay exception, if two
levels of hearsay are present) can be excluded because of
the incompetency of its contents.
I. Recordations Made by Medical Authorities
The vast majority of entries contained in hospital rec-
ords are recordations of fact or opinion derived from the
personal observation of a doctor, intern, nurse, or other
hospital employee. There rarely will exist any grounds
for claiming that these entries are not pathologically
germane to diagnosis or treatment, as they are in essence
notations concerning the bases for diagnostic opinion, the
diagnostic opinion itself, action taken in preparing one
for an operation, incidents occurring in the performance
of an operation, the patient's reaction, treatment rendered,
rehabilitation and steps taken in that regard, medications
prescribed and administered, or orders given to a nurse
or intern for the purpose of treating the patient.
Such information can be classified into three categories:
(1) statements of facts directly observed, e.g. temperature,
pulse, blood pressure, respiration, medicine administered,
food, behavior, results of tests, x-ray examinations, de-
tails of operations, and facts revealed by autopsies; (2)
opinions or diagnoses drawn from the facts listed under
category (1) or from observed facts which are not so
recorded; and (3) orders given to nurses or interns.
In so far as these entries are concerned there may be
only one level of hearsay involved. In most cases the
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entrant is the person who observed the recorded facts, but
in a few the entrant records what is dictated by a superior
or equal. It could be argued that in such cases there is
a double hearsay problem. However, it seems clear that
under such circumstances the entrant is considered to be
an agent of the declarant,5 9 or both are considered to be
agents of the hospital.
A. Recordations of Matters Directly Observed
Similarly, most of the entries included in category (1)
theoretically involve hearsay without regard to the record
itself, although the law does not generally recognize it as
such. In the main they depend upon the assumed accuracy
of some scientific or mechanical device not subject to cross
examination, such as a watch, thermometer, microscope, or
pressure gauge for their credibility, as well as upon the
accuracy with which the entrant read and recorded what
the device indicated. However, the law does not exclude in-
formation based upon scientific devices which have long been
recognized as being accurate." To the contrary, evidence
obtained by use of a scientific device is admissible if it
is proved that the device is generally accepted (or if it is
such that the court will take judicial notice of its accuracy)
and was of a standard make and in reasonable condition,
and that the person using the device and testifying as to
its revelations was skilled in its use." Thus, entries based
upon facts derived by the use of scientific devices are not
excluded by the rule against hearsay unless the matter con-
tained therein does not qualify as acceptable scientific evi-
dence or the record itself fails, for some other reason, to
satisfy the exception for business records.
B. Opinion - Diagnoses
The primary problem with entries of the nature under
discussion is that many constitute representations of
Stidger v. McPhee, 15 Colo. App. 252, 62 P. 332 (1900); Cohen v.
Bogatzky, 149 Md. 134, 131 A. 32 (1925); Heiskell v. Rollins, 82 Md.
14, 33 A. 263 (1895) ; 2 JONES, EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1958) § 290. The entry
must be made by a person having personal knowledge or from information
coming to him in the regular course of business. Thus, this kind of
double hearsay is permitted by the authorities.
0 Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W. 2d 593 (1949); MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE (1954) § 170. For discussion of the analogous question of
whether there is a hearsay problem in relation to entries made from
personal observation but based in part, if not in whole, on knowledge de-
rived from lectures, books, -or the experience of others, see infra, n. 62.
"
1Boeche v. State, supra, n. 60, McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. 416, 235,
S.W. 2d 173 (1950).
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opinion. For the most part these opinions are as to matters
which require expert or skilled knowledge and experience.
It is generally held that an expert may voice his opinion
as to such matters if he shows a reasonable basis for such
an opinion," but he probably does not have to state
all of the salient facts which constitute the bases for that
opinion. 3 A specific problem which is not present where
an expert is himself on the stand arises in relation to opinion
contained in a hospital record, since there is no opportunity
for cross-examination. Thus, counsel for the side against
which a record is offered does not have the same oppor-
tunity to attack the validity of the opinion as he would
have if the expert was testifying. Although the courts have
not expressly dealt with this problem, the results of their
decisions imply that the recordation of facts in the hospital
record present sufficient bases for the various opinions
which may be contained therein. In this regard expert
opinion as to diagnoses has been admitted through a hos-
pital record where it was stated that the patient was suf-
fering from a "fractured right clavicle,"64 a deviation of the
nasal septum,"3 a cerebral hemorrhage,66 an ulcer -
"chronic prostatis and seminal vesiculitis, '67 venereal
disease (listed as cause of death),6 nephritis,69 and
"moderately advanced tuberculosis,"7 although the bases
for such opinions were not specifically stated. Similarly,
11McCoRMIcK, op. cit. supra, n. 60, §§ 13-14; 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd
ed. 1940) § 1922; Maguire & Hakery, Requisite Proof of Basis for Expert
Opinion, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 432 (1952). It is noted that a physician or
expert is justified in basing his opinion on certain types of hearsay
declarations. H. & H. Supply Co. v. United States, 194 F. 2d 553 (10th
Cir. 1952) (knowledge acquired from leases and "various hearsay
sources") ; Carbone v. Boston & Maine R.R., 89 N.H. 12, 20, 192 A. 858,
863 (1937) (experience) ; Walker v. Great Atlantic & Racific Tea Co.,
131 Tex. 57, 112 S.W. 2d 170 (1938) (statement by patient). Clearly
an expert is allowed to base his opinion upon knowledge secured from
text books, lectures, his colleagues, or writings of recognized professional
authority. Laird v. Boston & Me. R.R., 80 N.H. 377, 117 A. 591 (1922)
MoKEL E , EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1944) § 190, 353-4.
6 Morrow v. National Masonic Ace. Ass'n, 125 Iowa 633, 101 N.W. 468
(1904); Grison Oil Corporation v. Corporation Commission, 186 Okl.
548, 99 P. 2d 134 (1940). Contra, Raub v. Carpenter, 187 U.S. 159, 161
(1902)Topinion as to sanity) ; Brown v. Mobile Electric Co., 207 Ala. 61,
91 So. 802 (1921). See 82 A.L.R. 1338.
Wickman v. Bohle, 173 Md. 694, 196 A. 326 (1938).
Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 115 F. 2d 492 (2d Cir. 1940).
SBuckminster's Estate v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 147 F. 2d 331
(2d Cir. 1944).
61Adler v. New York Life Ins. Oo., 33 F. 2d 827 (8th Cir. 1929).
6 Lado v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 182 La. 726, 162 S. 579 (1935).
Kirkpatrick v. Wells, 319 Mo. 1040, 6 S.W. 2d 591 (1928).
" Conlon v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 R.I. 88, 183 A. 850
(1936).
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in Watt3 v. State,70a a criminal case wherein the defendant
entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, it was
held that it was not reversable error to admit the testi-
mony of an expert psychiatric witness who had personally
examined the defendant and had also reviewed objec-
tive data which had been recorded by another expert who
had also examined the defendant. In so holding, the Court,
after restating the general rule that an expert may not
base his opinion upon the opinions or conclusions of other
experts, said:
"But the prohibition does not extend to data of an
objective nature duly entered in hospital or similar
records, even though the tests employed may require
a considerable measure of skill and. judgment for
proper evaluation. ''1b
Although the records utilized by the witness were not
placed in evidence, the Watts case clearly indicates that
not only can the objective data contained in a medical
record be used to support a diagnostic opinion contained
therein, but also can be used to support expert testimony
which is given by one other than the entrant. On, the other
hand, in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Zapf,71 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that an x-ray report of a ra-
diologist to whom Zapf had been sent by his doctor was
inadmissible when proffered through the doctor. In so
holding the Court treated the recorded material as opinion
evidence and indicated that such a report could not be
admitted without the declarant being present so as to be
"subject to cross-examination as to the reasons for his
findings." Thus, in relation to this record the Court in-
dicated that the facts revealed in the report were not
in themselves satisfactory support for the written opinion.
It is to be noted that many diagnostic opinions are
based in part, if not in whole, upon facts related by the
patient. This factor will not generally prevent the stating
of the opinion, since most courts admit the diagnosis of a
physician which is based to some degree upon facts re-
0- 223 Md. 268, 164 A. 2d 334 (1960).
• b Idl., 272.
7192 Md. 403, 64 A. 2d 139 (1949). In the Zapf case the Court, al-
though not absolutely clear upon the subject, indicated that ithe opinions
contained in the x-ray report, being those 'of the radiologist and not of
the witness, could not be received through that report since the witness
was "not competent to testify as to what [the radiologist] concluded
from an examination of those x-ray plates." Furthermore, the eourt said
that the report was not of the nature of a hospital record and could not
therefore, be admitted as a record prepared In the regular course of
business. Supra, circa n. 1.
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lated to him by the patient.72 This rule appears to be based
upon one or both of the following theories: (1) that the
statement, in so far as it is made for the purpose of treat-
ment, is highly reliable, since it is not likely that one
honestly seeking medical assistance will consciously mis-
represent his physical condition;73 and (2) that the physi-
cian is competent to decide whether or not the statement
is true and significant in making his diagnosis.74 On the
other hand, if the physician was consulted for the purpose of
qualifying him as an expert, there is present in the patient
a motive to misrepresent, and therefore in that case the
opinion is not received.7 5 If, therefore, a physician is per-
mitted to voice an opinion on the stand which is partially
based on the statements of a patient on which he relied
for treatment, there is no reason for excluding such
opinion when contained in a hospital record, so long as
from the facts so received and those personally observed
the physician's diagnostic opinion was reasonable.
In regard to hospital records containing opinion, the
courts have generally ignored the opinion problem in
rendering their decisions. The majority has admitted en-
tries, such as those cited above, whether or not any objec-
tion was made to their being opinion.76 A second, and
minority, view restricts admissibility to entries where the
diagnostician is clearly identified, and his professional
training and experience is such as to qualify him as an
expert in the field in which the diagnosis is made.77 A
72 Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Clinton, 224 F. 896 (8th Cir. 1915) ;
Block v. Milwaukee St. Ry. Co., 89 Wis. 371, 61 N.W. 1101 (1895) ; 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 680.
" Meany v. United States, 112 F. 2d 538, 130 A.L.R. 975 (2d Cir. 1940);
MCCoRIC, EVDxECE (1954) § 266. For a more complete discussion of
such statement see infra, II, C, ns. 114-116.
14 McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra, n. 73, § 16, 33.
"Nashville C. & St. L. R. Co. v. York, 127 F. 2d, 606 (6th Cir. 1942);
Greinki v. Chicago City R. Co., 234 Ill. 564, 85 N.E. 327 (1908) ; Reid v.
Yellow Cab 0o., 131 Ore. 27, 279 P. 635, 67 A.L.R. 1, 7 (1929) ; 3 WIoMoRE,
EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 688.
0 Becker v. United 'States, 145 F. 2d 171 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Reed v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers, 123 F. 2d 252 (2d Cir. 1941);
Wickman v. Bohle, 173 Md. 684, 196 A. 326 (1938); Conlon v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 R.I. 88, 183 A. 850 (1936). Cf. Glass v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 278 Mass. 127, 154 N.E. 563 (1927) ("Unless
radiation accomplishes a miracle the outcome will be fatal" excluded as
being a prophesy as distinguished from a diagnostic opinion). It is n'oted
that, in view 'of the Glass case, entries which make predictions or voice
opinions as to results of treatment are not considered to be part of a
proper diagnosis and fall into the category 'of mere speculations. See
Norville, The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 27 Ore. L. Rev.
188 (1948).
"West v. Fidelity-Balto. Bank, 219 Md. 258, 147 A. 2d 859 (1959);
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Relnhart, 152 Md. 439, 137 A. 43 (1927); Freed-
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third view restricts admissibility to diagnoses upon which
qualified doctors would not differ."
Maryland appears to conform with the second view
requiring that it be shown that the declarant was a
qualified expert. 9 In West v. Fidelity-Balto. Bank,"° a will
contest case, the Court held that a conclusion of insanity
in regard to the testator reached by trained psychiatric
nurses from observations of numerous strange acts and
recorded on medical charts was inadmissible because the
nurses were incompetent to draw the recorded conclusion.
In so holding, the Court said:
"While the charts would have been admissible as
entries made in the regular course of business . . . it
does not follow that everything in them was competent
evidence. We think it is clear that the statute"' did
not modify or alter the rule which forbids an expres-
sion of opinion by a person who is not competent to
express [it]." 2
This decision seems extremely harsh, especially when al-
most every state, including Maryland, 3 has held that even
lay witnesses are competent to give their opinion as to
the sanity of the testator.8 4 However, where a lay witness
testifies to the insanity of the testator, he is generally re-
quired to give the bases for such opinion. In the West case
the Court implied that the bases for the recorded opinion
were insufficient, but rather than determine the issue on
those grounds, it expressly stated that the entrants were
incompetent to draw such an opinion.
It would appear from the cases that a stricter view is
taken of entries containing diagnostic opinion where they
relate to one's psychiatric condition, 5 or probably to any
man v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 404, 21 A. 2d 81 (1941) ; Norville,
Sujpra, n. 76.
"
8New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. 2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1945)
Norville, supra, n. 76.
7"West v. Fidelity-Balto. Bank, 219 Md. 258, 147 A. 2d 859 (1959) ; Old
v. Cooney Detective Agency, 215 Md. 517, 138 A. 2d 889 (1958) ; Snyder
v. Cearfoss, 190 Md. 151, 57 A. 2d 786 (1948). But cf. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co. v. Zapf, supra, n. 71, where this seems to have been insufficient.82219 Md. 258, 147 A. 2d 859 (1959).
81 Supra, n. 46.
SSupra, n. 80, 265.
83 Smith v. Biggs, 171 Md. 528, 189 A. 756 (1937); Harris v. Hipsley,
122 Md. 418, 434-5, 89 A. 852 (1914) ; Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Berry, 93
Md. 560, 49 A. 401 (1901) ; Williams v. Lee, 47 Md. 321 (1877) ; Brooke
v. Berry, 2 Gill 62 (Md. 1842) ; GORTER, LAW OF EvIDENCE (1916) 212.
812 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE (1954) 194; 7 WimoRB,
EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 1950, 1984. See 155 A.L.R. 281 (1945).
*1 Cf. West v. Fidelity-Balto. Bank, 219 Md. 258, 147 A. 2d 859 (1959);
Wickman v. Bohle, 173 Md. 694, 196 A. 326 (1938).
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condition which is subject to diverging medical views. The
fact that psychiatric diagnoses are subject to debate, and
rarely of such a nature that psychiatrists will be in
unaminous agreement, has been expressed as the reason for
rejecting entries containing such opinions.,
In the final analysis, it seems clear that an entry which
states a diagnosis upon which reasonable physicians would
not differ would be admissible in all states for the purpose
of proving that the patient had such an ailment. However,
where the diagnosis is subject to debate, it would not be
admissible at all in a jurisdiction such as New York,so8 and
would be admissible in some states, including Maryland,
only if the competency of the diagnostician is shown.
Entries involving opinion evidence other than diagnoses
have been admitted. These have consisted of statements
concerned with the behavior of the patient while at the
hospital,"7 laboratory tests performed, 8 and the general con-
dition of the patient, e.g. "odor of alcohol on the breath."89
Since it can be argued that some of these matters do not
require expert opinion, they may present a problem which
the courts have not as yet discussed. With the exception of
cases involving sanity, it is generally held that an expert,
in testifying on matters on which laymen are competent to
voice an opinion, is not considered to be an expert and must
conform with the same requirements as laymen.9 ° In short
he must give the bases for his opinion, if such bases can
reasonably be put into words. 1 If from the facts as stated
by a witness the jury is capable of reaching a reasonable
conclusion, the witness is not generally permitted to state
his opinion. 2 It therefore appears that, if an entry con-
8 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. 2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
This case represents the strictest view requiring the opinion to be free
from objection by medical authorities, but the same concept seems to
exist in Maryland and Pennsylvania where the rules are not so rigid.
.. Id.
11 Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E. 2d 245 (1947).
s Grossman v. Delaware Electric Power Co., 34 Del. 521, 155 A. 806
(1929).
11 Reed v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 123 F. 2d 252 (2d Cir.
1941); Clark v. Beacon Oil Co., 271 Mass. 27, 170 N.E. 836 (1930); Leonard
v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 234 Mass. 489, 125 N.E. 593, 594 (1920);
Roberts v. Neilson, 262 App. Div. 1034, 30 N.Y.S. 2d 334 (1941). Contra:
Weller v. Fish Transport Co., 123 Conn. 49, 192 A. 317 (1937); Gerocami
v. Fancy Fruit & Produce Corp., 249 App. Div. 221, 291 N.Y.S. 837 (1936).
' McCoiICK, EVIDENCE (1954) § 13, 28, states that to justify the use of
expert testimony, "the subject of the inference must be so distinctively
related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond
the ken of the average laymen."
11 GoRTEn, loc. cit. 8upra, n. 83.
9 Grant v. Curtin, 194 Md. 363, 384-5, 71 A. 2d 304, 314 (1.950) said:
"When evidence to show mental incapacity relates ito circumstances
which are not obscure and need no explanation by a physician and
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tains an opinion which did not require expert knowledge
or experience and the bases for it could be intelligibly
stated to the jury if the declarant were present in court,
it should be excluded either because (1) the facts upon
which the opinion is based are not stated, or because (2)
the facts (which are stated) should go to the jury so that
it can reach the proper conclusion. The chief problem with
recorded opinion evidence is that neither can the declarant
be required to show the bases for his opinion before stat-
ing it, nor is there any opportunity to attack its validity on
cross-examination. In short, the opinion must be either
admitted or excluded on the strength of what bases are
indicated in the record itself. As in the case of expert
opinion, the courts have not directly dealt with this prob-
lem. However, those cases which have admitted opinions
of the nature under discussion imply that the problem
under discussion is not of importance.93
An additional problem is present if the opinion is such
that it expresses a conclusion of law or an ultimate fact
which is to be determined by the judge or jury. There is
considerable confusion as to how far a witness may go
toward suggesting the answer to an ultimate issue. All
jurisdictions bar the expression of statements as to what
the witness feels should be the outcome of the case. 4
Aside from that rule, there appear to be two views as to
the admissibility of opinions relating to an ultimate issue.
First, many courts hold that a witness cannot voice his
opinion upon an ultimate fact in issue,95 but if it is neces-
sary for the judge or jury to intelligently determine an
issue, expert opinion, and in some cases lay opinion, as
to that issue may be received.9 6 Under this view it is the
necessity for receiving the opinion that appears to be
controlling, and unless such is shown to be present the
opinion should be excluded. The second view is really one of
semantics - that if the witness signifies clearly that what
he states to be an ultimate fact is his opinion, it is admis-
sible, but if he states such as being an established fact,
are legally insufficient to support an Inference of incapacity, the
testimony of a medical expert Is not admissible to show that he
draws such an inference from such evidence, and if admitted, Is
not legally sufficient to show Incapacity."
"Grossman v. Delaware Electric Power Co., 34 Del. 521, 155 A. 806(1929); Leonard v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 234 Mass. 480, 125 N.E. 593
(1920) ; Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E. 2d 245 (1947).
MCCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE (1954) § 12, 25.
9 United States v. -Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 506 (1935); McCoRMIcK,
lo. cit. 8upra, n. 94, 26; MORGAx, loc. cit. supra, n. 84; WIGMORE, Op. Cit.
supra, n. 84, § 1951.
OeMCCORMICK, ZoO. cit. supra, n. 94, 26.
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it is excluded." It would appear that this view is based
mainly on a fear that the expert witness will over-impress
the jury if he is allowed to voice an opinion without clearly
indicating it to be such. In Maryland it is fairly well settled
that an expert cannot "usurp the function of the judge
or jury" by stating his opinion as to an ultimate fact in
issue." However, the Court of Appeals has also recognized
that the rule must be liberalized in accordance with the
nature of the case and the necessity for receiving expert
opinion,99 thus granting a preference in relation to such
opinion required by necessity. There is no question but
that these same views apply to opinions voiced in hospital
records since they have been held to be incompetent for
proving the existence of an ultimate fact."' However, in
each of the cited cases there was a lack of strict necessity
for the receipt of the proffered opinion, and hence the
question remains open as to whether a preference will
be given to the receipt of such evidence through a hospital
record where a strict necessity is present.
C. Orders to Nurses and Attendants
It is common practice in all cases involving hospitaliza-
tion for the attending physician to prepare records which
contain his orders and directions to nurses and attendants
for the care and treatment of the patient. These records
are of special significance in malpractice cases, where the
patient has suffered bodily harm while undergoing medical
treatment, since they constitute direct and original evi-
dence of what the physician ordered for correcting what
he diagnosed to be the physical or mental condition of the
patient. In such situations no double hearsay problem is
Id., 27, and cases cited therein.
'Baber v. John C. Knipp & Sons, 164 Md. 55, 163 A. 862 (1933);
McClee v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124 (1930) ; Baltimore C. & A. Ry.
Co. v. Moon, 118 Md. 380, 84 A. 536 (1912) ; Hanrahan v. City of Balti-
more, 114 Md. 517, 80 A. 312 (1911). The ultimate issue doctrine appears
to this writer to be unnecessarily harsh. Where the person possessing
such opinion is testifying on the stand, there is ample opportunity to
test the validity of his conclusions, 'and they can be either qualified or
destroyed by intelligent cross-examination. However, there is more justi-
fication for the rule when applied to hearsay opinion since in such a
case there is no opportunity for cross-examination.
Langenfelder v. Thompson, 179 Md. 502, 20 A. 2d 491, 136 A.L.R. 960
(1941).
100 Scott v. James Gibbons Co., 192 Md. 319, 64 A. 2d 117 (1949) ; Case
v. Vearrindy, 339 Mich. 579, 64 N.W. 2d 670 (1954) (entry by one other
than the defendant held to be inadmissible to show that defendant in a
malpractice suit had known of a serious condition and negligently dis-
regarded it) ; Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 280 Mich. 378, 273 N.W. 737
(1937) (inadmissible to prove accident had in fact happened) ; Schmitt
v. Doehler Die Casting Co., 143 Ohio St. 421, 55 N.E. 2d 644 (1944).
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involved since the proffer of the entry is made only to
show that a particular statement was made, and not the
truth of it. These records may show that the physician was
negligent in handling the case by ordering improper
treatment, or they may, along with evidence of what
treatment was actually rendered, show that a nurse or
attendant was negligent in the way he carried out the
physician's orders. There is no apparent basis upon which
records of this nature can be excluded from evidence in so
far as they are offered to prove what the orders of the
attending physician were. They are, in most cases, direct
and original evidence of those orders and are unquestion-
ably germane to treatment. Thus, they are properly a part
of a hospital record and should be admitted with the
record under the business records rule,
II. Recordations of Statements of Patient or
His Representative
As indicated earlier, the main problem relating to re-
corded declarations of the patient or his representative lies
in the fact that most of these entries contain two levels of
hearsay. The record, itself being hearsay, constitutes! the
first level; and since the credibility of the record depends,
in part, upon the veracity of the declarant who was not the
entrant, the recorded declaration creates the second level
of hearsay. The problem of double hearsay, or hearsay
upon hearsay, was of occasional interest in relation to
recordations made by medical authorities from personal
observation or information gathered by assistants or
superiors. In the ensuing discussion it is of constant im-
portance, and much of the discussion is directed toward
the problems presented by the second level of hearsay.
There are essentially three categories into which in-
formation afforded by the patient or his representative
may fall: (1) matters of pedigree, including (a) matters
relating to the patient's personal status and identification
- his date of birth, occupation, nationality, and religion,
and (b) information concerning familial medical history
- the names and ages of close relatives, cause of death of
the patient's parents, familial tendencies toward disease,
and history as to insanity, imbecility, hereditary diseases,
and behavior; (2) matters relating to present bodily con-
dition - signs and symptoms of the patient's injury or
disease, statements of any previous treatment, and a synop-
sis of the patient's medical history including illnesses
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(with or without complications), operations and injuries,
habits, social conditions, environment, and any other data
which may be pertinent to the existing illness or injury;
and (3) in accident cases often a statement as to how the
injury was sustained, including information as to why,
when, and where the injury was sustained.
A. Admissions and Declarations Against Interest
Statements made by patients which fall under any of
the above categories may constitute an admission or a
declaration against interest. Such declarations clearly
satisfy an exception to the hearsay rule in so far as the
second level of hearsay is concerned. The primary prob-
lem with them is in determining whether they are patho-
logically germane for the purpose of qualifying the record
under the business records rule. In Watts v. Delaware
Coach Co.,' the court, in holding that a hospital record
containing a statement by the plaintiff that he "twisted his
ankle while walking along the sidewalk" was admissible
as an admission against his interests in a suit against a
bus company for negligently causing the injury which
resulted in his hospitalization, said:
"The rule . . .seems clearly to be this - that admis-
sions against their interests by patients regularly en-
tered in hospital records . . . may be received in
evidence at a trial only if so related to the complaint
or injury involved as to facilitate prompt and intelli-
gent diagnosis and treatment."'0 2
Compare Young v. McLaughlin,103 in which the plaintiff in
seeking to recover the custody of her child from its maternal
grandparents, alleged that the said grandparents were men-
tally incompetent. The court there held that a statement made
by the plaintiff and recorded while she was hospitalized,
that her parents were mentally sound, was inadmissible as
being either confidential information or hearsay. Simi-
larly, in Cohen v. Borough of Bradley Beach,0 4 the court
held that a statement by the plaintiff as to how she had
sustained an injury was inadmissible through a hospital
record although it was clearly against her interest at the
trial.
1044 Del. 283, 58 A. 2d 689 (1948), noted in 47 Mich. L. Rev. 124 (1948).
l0Id., 695. Emphasis added. See also Shivers v. Carnagglo .... Md.-
.. .165 A. 2d 898 (1960).
'126 Colo. 188, 247 P. 2d 813 (1952).
135 N.J.L. 276, 50 A. 2d 882 (1947).
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Although the court in the Watts case specifically dis-
cussed the question as to whether the admission was
pathologically germane, the courts in the Young and Cohen
cases said no more than that the entries were hearsay and
hence inadmissible. Nevertheless, the decisions in the later
two cases would seem to imply that the entries failed to
satisfy the business records rule because the contents were
not pathologically germane.
Entries of the nature under discussion are usually made
as a matter of routine and in accordance with directives
of the hospital staff. They, therefore, are generally pre-
pared in the regular course of the hospital's business.
Nonetheless, if they do not comply with legal concepts as
to what information is pertinent to the making of an in-
telligent diagnosis or to the rendering of treatment, they
will be excluded. This result seems to be unjust, since in
qualifying as an admission or declaration against interest,
a particular statement is considered to have a high circum-
stantial probability of trustworthiness and, similarly, the
entry itself should be considered trustworthy since it was
made in the regular course of business by one having a
duty to make it. Therefore, should emphasis really be
placed on whether the statement was pathologically ger-
mane?
B. Matters of Pedigree
Those matters included in category (1) might appear
on their face to satisfy the exception to the rule against
hearsay for declarations of family history or pedigree. 1°5
This exception is generally held to cover information con-
cerning familial history, which is possessed (often by
reason of hearsay or double hearsay declarations) and nar-
rated by one who is a close blood relative, or closely re-
lated by marriage, to the person to whom the declaration
refers.106 However, a definite problem arises in connection
with these entries since a declaration, in order to satisfy
the exception for matters of pedigree, is supposed to have
made ante litem motam -, before any motive to misrepre-
"'Pollack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 F. 2d 123 (3rd Cir. 1943)
noted in 43 Mich. L. Rev. 411 (1944) ; Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Hen-
derson Cotton Mills, 120 Ky. 218, 85 S.W. 1090 (1905); Pickering v.
Peskind, 43 Ohio App. 401, 183 N.E. 301 (1933); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
(3rd ed. 1940), §§ 1480, 1490.
l Pollack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 F. 2d 123 (3rd Cir. 1943);
Craufurd v. Blackburn, 17 Md. 49 (1861) ; GORTR, LAW OF EVIDENCE (1916)
104; McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) § 297, 621-623; WIGMORE, 100. Cit.
8upra, n. 105, 1480; Note, Admissibility of Parents' Hearsay Declarations
on Paternity, 32 Iowa L. Rev. 778 (1947).
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sent arises,107 and in most cases involving hospital records
a cause of action has already come into being which gives
the declarant a motive to misrepresent. This is especially
true in cases involving personal injury resulting from a
transaction which occurred outside of the hospital. If, on
the other hand, the injury was sustained while in the
hospital, as happens in many malpractice cases, there would
be no grounds for objection, since the patient's statements
concerning his family history would have been taken and
recorded ante litem motam. Despite the presence of possi-
ble objection on these grounds, the courts have generally
admitted entries of this nature under the exception for
matters of pedigree.
It has been stated that matters relating to the age,
status, and identification of the patient, even though satis-
fying the hearsay rule, should be excluded unless they are
of assistance to the attending physicians, nurses, or at-
tendants.' This argument is sound if the "pathologically
germane" rule is accepted, for otherwise the entry would
not be pathologically germane and therefore would not
satisfy the hearsay exception for the first, i.e. business
records, level of hearsay.10 9
Statements relating to a party's occupation, nationality,
race, or religion cannot be considered to be medically im-
portant except in rare cases,"0 and hence should be ex-
cluded on the strength of the argument offered in support
of excluding entries relating to age. Furthermore, such
information is not usually relevant to any issue under liti-
gation. There are, of course, cases where occupation or
nationality may be of importance. However, even if it can
'0"MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) § 297, 622; 5 WiMoRm, EVIDENCE (3rd
ed. 1940), § 1483.
10 Note, Evidence - Admissibility of Age in Hospital Record as Business
Entry, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 411 (1944).
101 However, in Pollack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 F. 2d 123, 128
(3rd Cir. 1943), an entry as to the patient's age was admitted in defense
of a suit on an insurance policy to show that the deceased patient's age
had been misstated on the policy, which misstatement expressly in-
validated the policy. There was no indication that the age of the de-
ceased was of particular medical importance. The court without dis-
cussing this factor merely stated that:
"A patient's age is, as a matter of common knowledge, a relevant
part of medical history and the record should be admissible . . . as
proof of the fact."
Thus, it would appear that, at least according to this case, (age is always
to be considered as being pathologcially germane.
11 It is noted that such information could be pathologically germane
to treatment; e.g., In a malpractice case where a doctor is charged with
having been negligent for failing to administer whole blood to a patient,
it would be pertinent to show that the patient was a Jehovah's Witness,
the members of which sect do not believe in the administration of whole
blood.
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be found that such information is relevant to the litigation,
it is hard to find that it was pathologically germane to
diagnosis or treatment - and under legal standards a
proper part of the hospital record.
Information concerning other members of the family
and familial medical history are not open to as many ob-
jections. Entries as to the age of ancestors are, of course,
subject to the same criticisms; but it is clear that declara-
tions relating to the manner in which one's parents' died,
diseases which have frequented the family, familial his-
tory as to insanity, inbecility, and general behavior, have
definite value in making a medical diagnosis, at least where
the patient is suffering from a disease. It is questionable
whether such information is pathologically germane in
an accident case where the injuries are purely external.
Therefore, it appears that the courts will often admit
entries containing matters of pedigree under the appro-
priate hearsay exception despite the fact that in more cases
than not they fail to satisfy that exception since they were
made after the declarant had a motive to misrepresent.
However, it may well be that an objection on these grounds
would be sustained if specifically raised. Aside from that,
there appears to be no hearsay objection to the type of
entry under discussion; but there may well be a valid
objection to the receipt of the record itself since the matter
contained in the entry was not pathologically germane and
therefore should not have been included in the record.
C. Statements of Physical or Mental Condition
Statements about the physical or present mental condi-
tion of the declarant will, as a rule, satisfy one of the three
res gestae exceptions - statements of present bodily condi-
tion, declarations expressing state of mind or emotion, and
excited utterances.11 With the exception of statements
evincing state of mind, the reliability of the statements
included in these exceptions depends to a large extent upon
n"McCormick lists a fourth exception, declarations of present sense
impressions, which is considered to cover statements "accompanying non-
starting events or relating to a condition which the declarant is ob-
serving." Such statements, in that they are made while an event i%
happening, are considered to be reliable in that they are free from fa
possible failure of memory and there is little opportunity to make a
deliberate misstatement. See MCCORTfIcK, op. cit. supra, n. 106, § 273,
254; Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res
Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229, 236-39 (1922).
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the spontaneity with which they are uttered.112 The law
requires that the declaration be spontaneous, that is, it
must be made contemporaneously with and growing out of
the transaction to which it refers.11 It is noted that this
requirement is not the same as the "contemporaneous" re-
quirement of the business record rule. There the require-
ment is simply that the record must be prepared at the
same time or soon after the happening of the recorded
transaction. The problem as to what is considered to be
"spontaneous" is more complex.
Under the exception for statements of present bodily
condition, the normal expressions of pain or mental suf-
fering made by one at the time an injury is sustained or
a disease becomes apparent, are admissible." 4 This ex-
ception has also been held to have been satisfied by state-
" GoETER, LAW OF EVIDENCE (1916) 93; McCoRMicx, Zoe. cit. supra, n.
111, 587; McKELvEY, EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1944) § 277, 498; 6 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 1749, 139. Wigmore states:
"The utterance, it is commonly said, must be 'spontaneous,' 'natural,'
'impulsive,' 'instinctive,' 'generated by an excited feeling which ex-
tends without let or breakdown from the movement of the event they
illustrate.'
"'Beth. 'Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 381, 50 A. 2d 256
(1947) ; Case v. Vearrindy, 339 Mich. 579, 64 N.W. 2d 670 (1954) ; Brown
v. Saint Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W. 2d 688 (1954) ; Ribas
v. Revere Rubber Co., 37 R.I. 189, 91 A. 58 (1914), citing Chaffee & Co.
v. United States, 18 Wall. 516 (U.S. 1873).
The prevailing view is that for a declaration to be "spontaneous" it
must be connected with the transaction in such a manner as reasonably
to be a part thereof. Baltimore City v. Lobe, 90 Md. 310, 45 A. 192
(1900) ; 2 JONES, EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1958) § 319; 6 WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE
(3rd ed. 1940) § 1749. It cannot be the result of premeditation or re-
flection; Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F. 2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd.
318 U.S. 109 (1943). And, although the declaration need not be made at
the identical point of time as the transaction, it must have been made at
a time close enough thereto as to fairly be a part thereof; Baltimore City
v. Lobe, 90 Md. 310, 45 A. 192 (1900). In short, the rule is that the
declaration must be a part of 'the res gestac. However, as to what is
truly a part of the res gestac or "contemporaneous" with a transaction is
a matter of considerable confusion. Most writers and courts alike have
criticized the use of the term res gestac as being too vague and of no
meaning; MCCORMICK, op cit. supra, n. 107, § 274, 587; WiOmORE, supra,
n. 107, § 1767; Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissi-
ble as Res Gestac, 31 Yale L.J. 229 (1922). Oliver Wendell Holmes once
said, "The man that uses that phrase shows that he has lost temporarily
all powers of analyzing ideas." 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLmiS OF EVIDENCE
(1954), 284, n. 1. Similarly, Judge Learned Hand commented, "and as
for 'res gestae' . . . if It means anything but an unwillingness to think
at all, what it covers cannot be put in less intelligible terms." United States
v. Matot, 146 F. 2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944) ; MORGAN, supra.
"IAtlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Dixon, 207 F. 2d 899 (5th Cir. 1953);
Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md,. 546, 39 A. 2d 546, 550 (1944)
Bacon v. The Inhabitants of Charlton, 61 Mass. 581 (1851) ; Northern Pac.
R. Co. v. Urlin, 158 U.S. 271, 274 (1895) ; Freedman v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of N.Y., 342 Pa. 404, 21 A. 2d 81, 135 A.L.R. 1249 (1941) (symptoms
recorded in medical records admissible).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ments of medical history."5  Such a "history," however,
must be pertinent to the existing disease or injury, or in
other words, it must be germane to diagnosis or treat-
ment."' It would appear that in regard to this form of
declaration the required circumstantial probability of trust-
worthiness is found more in the natural instinct of man to
truthfully state his physical condition so as to receive the
relief he seeks, than upon spontaneity.
However, in many cases, the material contained in a
declaration of symptoms constitutes opinion or mere specu-
lation, and may be inadmissible because the patient was
not capable of reliably stating such an opinion since it was
a matter only for a medical expert.117 Thus, if a patient
stated that he had been suffering from repeated heart
tremors, the entry recording that belief should be excluded.
The patient would be capable of stating that he had suf-
fered sharp pains in his chest, but he is not competent as
a layman to draw the conclusion that the pains stemmed
from his heart.
Not all of the statements of a patient reveal symptoms
of physical injury or disease. In many cases his state of
mind is of the utmost importance and germane to both
diagnosis and treatment. This is especially true in psychi-
"5Meany v. United States, 112 F. 2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940); Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Baugh, 87 F. 2d 240 (C.C.A. Tex. 1937);
Lowery v. Jones, 219 Ala. 201, 121 So. 704 (1929); Arabia v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 301 Mass. 397, 17 N.E. 2d 202 (1938). Cf.
Freedman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 342 Pa. 404, 21 A. 2d 81,
135 A.L.R. 1249 (1941) ; Roth v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n of America,
102 Tex. 241, 248, 115 S.W. 31 (1909).
"I Arabia v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 301 Mass. 397, 17 N.E.
2d 202 (1938). It is to be noted that, if a statement in a hospital record
does satisfy the exception under discussion, it automatically satisfies
the corresponding element of the business records exception, since it would
have already been found to be pathologically germane, and hence, properly
recorded in the course of ordinary hospital business.
n7 For a complete discussion of the opinion rule see ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED WRITINGS ON EVIDENCE AND TRIAL
(1957, Chap. 6, 467-604); 3 JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1926) §§ 1241-1375; McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE (1954) §§ 11-18, 21-39; 7
WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 1917-2028. A patient may not testify
as to his own mental condition, Frisone v. United States, 270 F. 2d 401
(9th Cir. 1959) ; existence of an ulcer, United States v. McCreary, 105 F. 2d
297 (9th Cir. 1939) ; existence of diabetes, United States v. Johnson, 94
F. 2d 539 (8th Cir. 1938) ; existence of tuberculosis, Cox v. United States,
103 F. 2d 539 (8th Cir. 1938); or a past heart attack, 'Peters v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of New York, 26 F. Supp. 50 (D.C. M.D. Pa. 1939). How-
ever, a lay witness has been held capable tof testifying that he was treated
for a throat infection, Smith v. Weber, 70 S.D. 322, 16 N.W. 2d 537 (1944) ;
and that he had suffered a broken 'bone, Kinner v. Boyd, 139 Iowa 14,
116 N.W. 1044 (1908). The underlying rationale in these cases is that a lay
person is incapable of conclusively determining the nature 'of a serious
illness since such is beyond his knowledge, while he is capable of
realizing that he has certain minor physical disorders.
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atric cases where medical authorities are interested in in-
dications of mental condition rather than mental grievance
or suffering as exemplified by personal injury cases pro-
ducing shock. Declarations evincing a presently existing
state of mind - e.g. intent, motive, desires, design, pur-
pose, assent, knowledge, or belief - as distinguished from
a present memory of a past event, have been admitted un-
der a separate exception to the hearsay rule"'8 when of-
fered to prove the truth of the matters asserted. It is
noted that in many cases it is what the patient believes
that is pathologically germane, and the truth of any as-
sertion contained in the declaration is of no importance.
In such cases there is of course no double hearsay prob-
lem, and the entry should be admitted even if it consti-
tutes unqualified and incompetent opinion.1 19
Under the hearsay exception for excited utterances,
statements or exclamations made by a patient and recorded
could satisfy the second level of hearsay, if they were made
under the immediate influence of the occurence which
produced the nervous excitement,20 and if the expressions
related to that occurence. 121 It is the spontaneous nature
of the declaration which provides the necessary circum-
stantial probability of trustworthiness. Spontaneity being
the important factor, time cannot have provided the de-
clarant with an opportunity to continue and misrepre-
sent.'2 2 Applying the above rules to declarations entered in
a hospital record, it would appear that the declaration
would have to relate to a personal injury case, since in cases
involving disease there rarely is present an exciting event.
The main problem with excited utterances lies in the first
level of hearsay. Under the requirement that the exclama-
tion relate to the occurence which produced nervous ex-
citement, the exclamation will not generally be patho-
logically germane to diagnosis or treatment; and according
to legal concepts it would not be a proper part of the hos-
18 Raborn v. Hayton, 34 Wash. 2d 105, 208 P. 2d 133 (1949) ; McCoRMIcK,
op. cit. supra, n. 117, § 268, 567; 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENGE
(1954) 290-291; 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 1714; Hutchins
and Slesinger, State of Mind in Issue, 29 Col. L. Rev. 147 (1929). Exiam-
ples of such statements are: declarations of a testattor as to his intent
to make a will of certain tenor, Or to disown someone, 126 A.L.R. 1129,
1139 (1940) ; statements indicating an intent to commit suicide, 83 A.L.R.
426, 434 (1933).
"I Supra, circa n. 10.
'2 Showalter v. Western R. Co., 16 Cal. 2(1 460, 106 P. 2d 895 (1940).
mId., but cf. Murphy Auto Parts Company v. Ball, 249 F. 2d 508 (D.C.
Cir. 1957). Hutchins and Slesinger, Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 Col. L.
Rev. 432, 439 (1928).
1' Id., McCoRMicK, op cit. supra, n. 117, § 272, 578: WIGMORE, Op. Cit.
supra, n. 118, § § 1745-1747.
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pital record. However, in Murphy Auto Parts Company
v. Ball, 123 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia voiced the opinion that the question
of whether an utterance "explained or illuminated" the
exciting event was only one factor to be considered in de-
ciding whether the exclamation was spontaneous' and that
it was not in itself controlling on the question of admissi-
bility. Thus, by this view, the exclamation could relate
facts stemming from, but not directly related to, an exciting
event, and it is more likely that it would be pathologically
germane. Nonetheless, if the exclamation relates matters
which are pertinent to diagnosis or treatment they prob-
ably would not be considered excited utterances, but state-
ments of presently existing bodily or mental condition, and
admissible under this separate and distinct hearsay ex-
ception.12 4
D. Entries Containing Narratives by a Patient as to
How Injury is Sustained
From the above, there appears to be little difficulty in
placing into evidence entries which indicate bodily or men-
tal conditions or feelings. Such entries are primarily rele-
vant in proving extent of injury and damages and should
be admitted for that purpose.'25 However, in the vast
majority of cases it is the entries which relate the manner
and circumstances in which a personal injury was sustained
that have real legal significance. These entries are per-
tinent in proving the essential elements of a given action,
whether civil or criminal, and are, therefore, of more in-
terest to the parties to an action. Of course, in malpractice
cases some of the other entries may be of more significance
than any narrative by the patient, but in most of the other
cases involving personal injury the parties to the litiga-
tion are primarily interested in entries which in some
manner sustain their position as to how the transaction
which produced the injury occurred.
Due to the variety of form and content that these
entries assume, in order for them to escape exclusion due
to their double hearsay nature, they bring into use almost
every exception to the rule against hearsay. In most cases
1-249 F. 2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Supra, circa ns. 111-116.
"I Gile v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358, 272 N.W. 706 (1937) (hospital record
competent evidence as to the question of whether an Infant, who had
been struck by an automobile, had died instantly or had survived and
suffered for a short period of -time.)
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they constitute admissions,126  dying declarations, 127 or
spontaneous statements (satisfying one of the so-called
res gestae exceptions).12 The courts generally have not
specified which exception a given entry must satisfy or
which one it did satisfy. However, it is clear that, though
an entry would normally satisfy an exception, the infor-
mation contained therein may not qualify as a proper part
of the hospital record which is ultimately being offered
into evidence, because the information may not be patho-
logically germane to medical diagnosis or treatment. Thus,
without fully discussing the entry in terms of being a dying
declaration, although it clearly appears to have been one,121
the Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v. Harris'3" held
that a declaration by a murder victim that he had been
shot "by a white man" was inadmissible on behalf of a
negro defendant because it did not aid in medical diagnosis
or treatment. The fact that the declarant was shot cer-
tainly was pertinent to diagnosis, but the entry was ex-
cluded by the excessive language which tended to identify
the assailant. It would clearly appear that most state-
ments which ordinarily satisfy the exception for dying
declarations, although the exception itself requires that
they relate to the circumstances surrounding the cause of
death,13 1 would necessarily be excluded for this reason.
The basic idea is that the cause of an accident or injury
is a proper part of the medical history of the patient, but
that the statement of that cause must be confined to matter
'-Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., 44 Del. 283, 58 A. 2d, 689 (1948), noted
in 47 Mich. L. Rev. 124 (1948) ; Cfohen v. Borough of Bradley Beach, 135
N.J.L. 276, 50 A. 2d 882 (1947). Cf. Young v. McLaughlin, 126 Oolo. 188,
247 P. 2d 813 (1952). See discussion, supra, II, A, circa ns. 101-104.
m Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 325, 41 A. 2d 688 (1945). Al-
though the court did not so term the deceased's declaration, it appears to
qualify as one.
" Old v. Cooney Detective Agency, 215 Md. 517, 138 A. 2d 889 (1958);
Shirks Motor Express v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 635, 106 A. 2d 46 (1954);
Lee v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore, 203 Md. 453, 101 A. 2d 832 (1954);
Beth. Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 50 A. 2d 256 (1947). Cf.
Scott v. James Gibbons Co., 192 Md. 319, 64 A. 2d, 117 (1949) ; Beverly
Beach Club v. Marron, 172 Md. 471, 475, 192 A. 279 (1937) ; Case v. Vear-
rindy, 339 Mich. 579, 64 N.W. 2d 670 (1954) ; Brown v. Saint Paul City
Ry. Oo., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W. 2d 688 (1954).
'2MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra, n. 117, §§ 258-264; McKelvey, (5th ed.
1944) §§ 260-264; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 1447-1452.
Supra, n. 127.
MMCCORMICK, Op. Cit. supra, n. 133, § 260, 558; MoKEL v Y, op. cit.
•supra, n. 129, § 264, 477; WIGMORE, loc. cit. 8upra, n. 129.
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having medical significance.1"2 Thus, in Scott v. James
Gibbons Co.138 the Court said:
"It is proper for the record to show the patient was
hurt in an ...accident, 'but the particulars of such
accident, contained in a hospital record, should be
deleted and not submitted to the jury. ... "I"
Following this line of thought, entries have been ex-
cluded which stated where an accident happened;"' that
the patient "fell off a ladder at Parker-Wolverine Company
on October lst;"'3 that the patient while boarding a street-
car on the sixteenth of May, 1950, was thrown from the
step when the door was closed suddenly in her face; 37 that
the patient at ". . . 12 a.m. slipped and fell across a
pipe which was about 1 foot off floor;"' 38 and that a
doctor who was the defendant in a malpractice suit had
told the patient, "there [was'] nothing to [her ailmentl."' 3
In comparison, entries have been admitted which showed
that the patient was injured in an automobile accident; 4 '
had suffered convulsions before driving into a parked
car, 141 and "cut [his] left foot and developed an infection
involving [his] entire leg,"'142 and had broken his ankle
when he twisted it while walking on a sidewalk.
143
It is plainly apparent that all of the above entries which
were held to be admissible said little or nothing that was
not germane to medical diagnosis or treatment, while those
excluded went further. No clear line can be drawn as to
what is pathologically germane. Some decisions, such. as
that in the Harris case, have been very restrictive; but
m Shirks Motor Express v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 635, 106 A. 2d 46
(1954); Lee v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore, 203 Md. 453, 101 A. 2d 832
(1954); Scott v. James Gibbons Co., 192 Md. 319, 64 A. 2d 117 (1949).
1S 192 Md. 319, 330, 64 A. 2d 117 (1949).
Id., 330.
"'North American Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hill's Adm'x., 182 Ky. 125, 206 S.W.
170, 171 (1918). It is to be noted that in some cases where an accident
happened could be of special significance and hence admitted.
1
,Sadjak v. Parker-Wolverine Co., 281 Mich. 84, 274 N.W. 719 (1937).
1' Brown v. Saint Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W. 2d 688 (1954).
13 Schmitt v. Doehler Die Casting Co., 143 Ohio 'St. 421, 55 N.E. 2d
644 (1944).
I" Case v. Vearrindy, 339 Mich. 579, 64 N.W. 2d 670 (1954).
"1 Scott v. James Gibbons Co., 192 Md. 319, 64 A. 2d 117 (1949).
"I Shirks Motor Express v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 635, 106 A. 2d 46
(1954).
4
2 Beth. Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 380-81, 50 A. 2d 256
(1947).
" Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., 44 Del. 283, 58 A. 2d 689, noted in 47
Mich. L. Rev. 124 (1948).
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the prevailing view seems to be that announced in Lee v.
Housing Auth. of Baltimore,144 where the Court, in holding
an entry containing a declaration that the patient was in-
jured when her "gas stove exploded" was admissible, said:
"In the instant case we think the record of the
alleged cause of the burns to be treated was a proper
part of the medical history. The entries do not under-
take to establish the cause of the explosion, but merely
relate to the nature of the substance causing the burns,
gas, and the character of the combustion, an explosion.
It is certainly customary and proper to record the type
of accident causing the injury, and this information
may have an important bearing upon the diagnosis, as
indicating what the doctors should look for, and upon
the treatment to be applied. We think the information
recorded, from whatever source obtained', was not
outside the regular course of professional inquiry."14" 5
What appears to be the true basis for determining what
is pertinent to diagnosis or treatment is founded in part
in the supposed circumstantial probability of trustworthi-
ness of declarations made to medical authorities for pur-
poses of treatment. A statement as to the cause of an
injury, being medically significant, is not likely to be mis-
stated; but related matter, such as where or why an injury
was sustained, rarely has medical value and in more
cases than not is self-serving and not truly trustworthy.
Therefore, it appears that a patient's statement will be
considered pertinent to diagnosis or treatment if it states
what directly caused an injury (as distinguished from
what caused an accident which produced the injury); and
in some instances when and where it was sustained; while
in most cases, where and why an accident happened or who
caused the accident or injury are not medically, and hence
legally, relevant, and therefore are inadmissible.
Even though an entry may appear to be pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment and within an exception to the
hearsay rule, there may be some additional factor present
which renders it inadmissible. In Beverly Beach Club v.
Marron141 the entry merely stated that the patient's "foot
[was] cut by broken glass," but the Court 'held it to be
inadmissible. Similarly in Slater v. United Fuel Gas Co. 47
'"203 Md. 453, 101 A. 2d 832 (1954).
'"Id., 460-461.
4 172 Md. 471, 475, 192 A. 279 (1937).
1'7126 W. Va. 127, 27 S.E. 2d 436 (1943).
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an entry stating "that while playing over a creek someone
must have lighted a match and set ablaze natural gas"
was excluded. Although the entry in the Slater case may
have possessed excess verbiage both of the above entries
were incompetent because they constituted declarations of
unfounded opinion and speculation. In the Beverly Beach
case the declarant had cut his foot while playing in the
water. He had found the remnants of a broken bottle, but
he was unable to say for sure that he had cut his foot on
the bottle. In the Slater case the declarant had not seen
anyone light a match and could only speculate upon the
alleged fact that it was natural gas which was ignited.
Thus, it is, clear that if an entry is based upon opinion,
such must be competently drawn, and probably sufficient
facts must be given indicating the basis of that opinion so
that the opinion rule is satisfied. 4 '
SuMMAnvRY
In final analysis, it becomes apparent that a hospital rec-
ord, without regard to the physician-patient privilege,
due to its high degree of reliability is admissible in evi-
dence under either the business records exception to the
hearsay rule or that for public documents, if the matters
contained therein were recorded in the regular course of
the hospital's business, contemporaneously with the trans-
action to which the record refers, and were pathologically
germane to either diagnosis or treatment. But in order for
these requirements to be met, the recorded matter must
be in itself competent evidence and relevant to the issue
in litigation. If the entry is a recordation of a physician's
diagnosis, laboratory reports, medications prescribed,
orders to nurses or attendants, or other matters within the
personal knowledge or opinion of the entrant, the entry
is admissible as long as any evidence based on scientific
devices was derived from those which have been recog-
nized as being reliable and any opinion contained in the
entry is shown to be competently drawn from reasonable
bases. On the other hand, if the entry is a recording of
statements made by the patient or his representative,
there is a double hearsay problem and the first level of
hearsay must satisfy some exception to the hearsay rule in
order for it to qualify as a competent part of the hospital
record.
,4 See discussion of recorded opinion evidence, supra, circa I B, ns. 62-100,
and n. 117.
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